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Abstract. We introduce PriCL: the first framework for expressing and
automatically reasoning about privacy case law by means of precedent.
PriCL is parametric in an underlying logic for expressing world prop-
erties, and provides support for court decisions, their justification, the
circumstances in which the justification applies as well as court hierar-
chies. Moreover, the framework offers a tight connection between privacy
case law and the notion of norms that underlies existing rule-based pri-
vacy research. In terms of automation, we identify the major reasoning
tasks for privacy cases such as deducing legal permissions or extract-
ing norms. For solving these tasks, we provide generic algorithms that
have particularly efficient realizations within an expressive underlying
logic. Finally, we derive a definition of deducibility based on legal con-
cepts and subsequently propose an equivalent characterization in terms
of logic satisfiability.
1 Introduction
Privacy regulations such as HIPAA, COPPA, or GLBA in the United States
impose legal grounds for privacy [31,37,38]. In order to effectively reason about
such regulations, e.g., for checking compliance, it is instrumental to come up
with suitable formalizations of such frameworks along with the corresponding
automated reasoning tasks.
There are currently two orthogonal approaches to how regulations are ex-
pressed and interpreted in real life that both call for such a formalization and
corresponding reasoning support. One approach is based on providing an explicit
set of rules that define what is allowed and what is forbidden. The alternative
is to consider precedents and case law, which is the approach predominantly
followed in many countries such as the US. Precedents are cases that decide a
specific legal context for the first time and thus serve as a point of reference
whenever a future similar case needs to be decided. Moreover, even judges in
countries that do not base their legal system on precedents often use this mech-
anism to validate their decision or shorten the process of argumentation.
Case law is particularly suitable for resolving vague formulations that nat-
urally occur in privacy regulations like the definition of ‘disclosure’ in COPPA:
“The term ‘disclosure’ means [...] the release of personal information collected
from a child in identifiable form”. Here, case law could reference decisions that
define what circumstances are qualified as a non-identifiable form of personal
data, thereby aiding the user by providing judicially accurate interpretation of
such terms.
While rule-based frameworks have received tremendous attention in previous
research (see the section on related work below) there is currently no formaliza-
tion for case law that is amenable to automated reasoning.
Our contribution. Our contribution to this problem space is threefold:
– We derive important legal concepts from actual judicial processes and rele-
vant requirements from related work. The resulting framework PriCL, can
be applied to the judicature of many different countries as it does not assume
any specific argumentation.
– We tailor the framework for privacy regulations. In particular, our privacy
specific case law framework is compatible with former policy languages since
it has only minimal requirements regarding the logic. Therefore, it is possible
to embed other formalizations into our framework.
– We define the major reasoning tasks that are needed to apply the framework
to privacy cases. In particular, these tasks allow us to derive requirements
for the underlying logic which we analyze. Several logics allow an embedding
of the reasoning tasks by giving an equivalent characterization of the tasks.
Consequently, we are able to select a well suited logic.
In total, the case law framework that we introduce gives a new approach for
compliance with privacy regulations. In particular, it makes it possible to im-
plicitly use any regulation if it was previously referenced by a judge. Moreover,
it also provides for reasoning tasks in cases where no regulation is applicable but
judicial precedents exist.
Related work. There are plenty of privacy regulations that companies are
required to comply with. In the US there are regulations for specific sectors,
e.g., HIPAA for health data, COPPA for children’s data, or GLBA and RFPA
for financial data. In the EU, the member states have general data protection
codes. The legislative efforts to harmonize these national codes via the EU Data
Protection Regulation [22] are proceeding and already provide for identifying
legislative trends. The importance and impact of these privacy regulations has
brought the interpretation thereof to the attention of more technically focused
privacy research [28,10,2,21,15,32].
Policy languages were mainly developed in order to model these regulations
and to reflect companies’ policies. Many of the modern logics modeling regula-
tions are based on temporal logic [24,12,19,36,11] and were successfully used to
model HIPAA and GLBA [20] and should be applicable to other regulations as
well. While these logics focus on expressiveness in order to reflect the regula-
tions, the logics for company policies focus on enforcement [9,5] and thus also on
authorization [1,5]. Consequently, company policies are mostly based on access
control policies [30,26].
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Bridging the gap between the regulation policies and the company’s policies
leads to automating compliance checks [35]. For many deployed policies, i.e.,
the ones that are efficiently enforceable, this is currently not possible due to
the lack of decidability regarding the logics used to formalize regulations. How-
ever, for these cases there exist run-time monitoring tools that allow compliance
auditing on log files [10,24,13,12]. In particular, such auditing was invented for
HIPAA [24].
A different approach for achieving compliance is guaranteeing privacy-by-
design [29,17,25]. However, the policy of these systems still needs to be checked
for compliance with the relevant privacy regulations.
There is also an orthogonal approach when designing privacy policies that
focus on the end user, i.e., designing a policy that is formal and can be formu-
lated in an user-understandable way [3]. First attempts using P3P [18,33,4] were
unsuccessful. However, it is important to incorporate the user in the process of
policy design in order to gain her trust [27,23].
2 Ingredients
In the first step we illustrate which components are essential for a case law frame-
work. To that end, we analyze actual judicial processes and derive ingredients
for the framework from the relevant legal principles. In particular, the court de-
cision and its justification give insights into how the decision is made and which
judicial concepts have to be reflected by our framework. Hence, in the following,
we analyze a representative court decision1 and discuss the implications for our
framework.
The conflict. “This matter involves three certified questions from the Circuit
Court of Harrison County regarding whether applicable state and federal privacy
laws allow dissemination of confidential customer information by an insurance
company to an unaffiliated third party during the adjustment or litigation of an
insurance claim.”
Every case reaching a court is based on a conflict, i.e., there is some question,
as the one above, for which different parties have different opinions on its truth
value.2 As a requirement for the framework, we can conclude that there has to
be a conflict that needs to be resolved by a decision. This decision can be an
arbitrary statement; hence, we call it a decision formula.
Sub-cases. A decision’s justification usually involves decisions of several sub-
cases in order to arrive at the final decision formula, e.g. the court needs to
1 The quotes are taken from MARTINO v. BARNETT, Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia, No. 31270, Decided: March 15, 2004. The decision text is public at
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/wv-supreme-court-of-appeals/1016919.html.
2 In the example case, the parties are a plaintiff, who was injured in a car accident,
and an insurance company, which refused to disclose the home address of the other
person involved in the accident. The insurance company claimed that to do so would
violate the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley-Act (GLBA) and the West
Virginia Insurance Commission’s Privacy Rule.
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decide whether a specific law is applicable before examining what follows from its
application. Each of these individual sub-case decisions may become a precedent
for decisions which deal with a similar sub-case.
The circumstances. “[The plaintiff] concedes that under the definitions of the
GLBA [...] information he requests is technically nonpublic personal information
of a customer which the Act generally protects from disclosure to nonaffiliated
third parties.”
Every case contains some factual background. These facts constitute some
statements which are not under discussion but measurably true, e.g., that an
address is nonpublic personal information. We summarize these facts in a case
description.
Referencing related court decisions. “[T]he United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia handed down an opinion in Marks
v. Global Mortgage Group, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 492 (S.D.W.Va.2003), providing us
with timely and pertinent considerations.”
The key of case law is referencing other cases in order to derive statements.
In the example case, this capability is used to introduce an argumentation from
a different court. This mechanism is also used when statements are derived
from regulations. Consequently, the framework has to be capable of introducing
statements during the case justification by references to their origin.
Argumentation structure of the justification. “[The] GLBA provides ex-
ceptions to its notification and opt-out procedures, including [...]”
The argumentation structure of the justification is not linear, i.e., of the
form A ⇒ B ⇒ . . . ⇒. But the arguments can be ordered in a tree form.
The exceptions stipulated by the GLBA are enumerated and then discussed
in the case justification. If more than one is applicable, these may serve as
independent decision grounds, each being a potential precedent in its own right.3
As a consequence, we believe that a proof tree fits the overall structure best.
World knowledge. “[We] conclude that nonpublic personal information may
be subject to release pursuant to judicial process.”
In the argumentation, the court leaves to the reader’s knowledge that the
plaintiff’s litigation actually is a “judicial process”. These open ends in the ar-
gumentation are neither explicitly covered by a decision nor by a case reference.
Therefore, we need some world knowledge KBW that will cover these axiomatic
parts of the argumentation.
Precedents and stare decisis.The doctrine of stare decisis (to stand by things
decided) or binding precedents is unique to common law systems. The decisions
of superior courts are binding for later decisions of inferior courts (vertical stare
decisis). These binding precedents are applied to similar cases by analogy.
A special case is the binding nature of previous decisions on the same hier-
archical level or by the deciding court itself (horizontal stare decisis). While the
details of binding precedents of different courts on the same level is subject to
3 O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 84 (1996).
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an ongoing scholarly debate, a court reversing itself is a more infrequent occur-
rence but usually has high impact (for example, in the years 1946-1992, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed itself in 130 cases4) and needs to be reflected in our
framework.5
In addition to the binding precedent, there also exists the persuasive prece-
dent: “While we recognize that the decision of the Marks court does not bind
us, we find the reasoning in Marks regarding a judicial process exception to the
GLBA very persuasive and compelling”.
Here, a court is not bound by an earlier decision, in our example because the
earlier decision was made by an inferior court, but finds the argumentation so
persuasive that it is voluntarily used as a precedent.
Stare decisis does not apply in civil law systems, like those of Germany
or France. However, these systems have a jurisprudence constante, facilitating
predictable and cohesive court decisions. Though civil law judges are not obliged
to follow precedents, they may use prior decisions as persuasive precedents and
oftentimes do so.
Material difference. Stare decisis only applies if the subsequent court has to
decide on a case or sub-case that is similar to the precedent. Therefore, if the
court finds material difference between the cases, it is not bound by stare decisis.
In practice, judges may claim material difference on unwarranted grounds, which
may lead to conflicting decisions of analoguous cases within our framework. Thus,
we need to be able to account for false material difference.
Involving court hierarchies. “[W]e look initially to federal decisions inter-
preting the relevant provisions of the GLBA for guidance with regard to the re-
formulated question. However, the issue proves to be a novel one in the country
since few courts, federal or state, have addressed the exceptions to the GLBA.”
For our framework we need to take into account court hierarchies to identify
binding precedents. In common law jurisdictions, inferior courts are bound by the
decisions of superior courts; in civil law jurisdictions superior courts usually have
higher authority without being strictly binding. In federal states like the USA
or Germany we need to account for parallel hierarchies on state and on federal
levels. This complex hierarchy has significant implications on stare decisis.6
4 Congressional Research Service — Supreme Court De-
cisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision (1992).
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/html/GPO-CONAN-1992-13.htm
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained its practice as follows: “[W]hen convinced
of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.” — Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)
5 Federal and state supreme courts are allowed to overrule their own precedents. State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 11
Cal. 4th 85, 93 (1995).
6 For example, state courts in the United States are not considered inferior to federal
courts but rather constitute a parallel court system. While state courts must follow
decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of federal law, federal
courts must follow decisions of the courts of each state on questions of that state’s
law.
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Hence, in our framework every case needs to be annotated by a court which
is part of a court hierarchy, to identify the character of precedents, binding or
potentially persuasive.
Ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Regarding the court’s decision text, we
need to differentiate between two types of statements. The actual binding prop-
erty of a precedent has only those statements and legal reasoning that are neces-
sary for the rationale of the decision. These necessary statements as called ratio
decidendi and constitute the binding precedent. Further statements and reason-
ing that are not essentially necessary for the decision are called obiter dicta.
These are not binding but can be referenced as persuasive precedents.
For our reasoning framework we need to differentiate and annotate state-
ments into these two different categories to correctly identify binding precedents.
3 Defining The PriCL Framework
Reflecting the observations just made, we define cases (Section 3.1) and case
law databases (Section 3.2). Thereby we also explain how to model the legal
principles described in Section 2. Then, we define how the database can be
used in order to deduce facts outside the framework (Section 3.3). We analyze
our framework, validating a number of basic desirable properties of case law
databases (Section 3.4). We finally show, for privacy regulations specifically,
that our framework matches the requirements identified by previous work [10]
(Section 3.5).
Throughout this section, we assume an underlying logic in which world prop-
erties are expressed and reasoned about. Our framework is parametric with
respect to the precise form of that logic. The requirements the logic has to
fulfill are interpreting predicates as relations over objects, supporting universal
truth/falseness (denoted respectively as ⊤ and ⊥), conjunction (denoted ∧), en-
tailment (denoted A |= B if formula A entails formula B), and monotonicity
regarding entailment, i.e., if A |= B then A∧C |= B for any formula C. We will
discuss later on (Section 5) a particular kind of logics suitable in our setting. As
an intuition when reading the following, the reader may assume we are using a
first-order predicate logic.
3.1 Introducing Cases
As we have seen, a case consists of a decision formula, a case description, a court,
and a proof tree. The first three components are straightforward to capture for-
mally (courts are represented by a finite set Courts of court identifiers). Designing
the proof tree is more involved since it needs to capture the judge’s justification.
We distinguish between different kinds of nodes in the tree depending on the
role the respective statements play in the justification: Does a sentence make an
axiomatic statement, or form part of the case description? Does it refer to a pre-
vious case, adopting a decision under particular prerequisites? Does it make an
assessment on the truth of a particular statement (e.g., that a particular piece of
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information is or is not to be considered private) under particular prerequisites?
All such statements are “standalone” in the sense that they are not implications
of previous arguments in the justification at hand. We therefore reflect them
in the leaf nodes of the proof tree, categorized by the three different types of
statements mentioned.
The inner nodes of the tree perform logical deductions from their children
nodes, representing the reasoning inherent in the justification, i.e., the conclu-
sions that are made until finally, in the tree root, the decision formula is reached.
Thereby, every inner node is annotated by an arbitrary formula. We differentiate
between two kinds of reasoning steps, AND-steps and OR-steps.The OR-steps re-
flect the principle of independent decision grounds , i.e., the cases that a judge
increases legal certainty by listing arguments that all for themselves are sufficient
for the conclusion. The AND-step is the natural conclusion steps that is used to
ensure that the decision made is reached through the argumentation.
In order to avoid a recursive definition, we need a (possibly infinite) set of
case identifiers CI . Throughout the paper we assume a fixed given set CI . This
leads to the following definition:
Definition 1 (Case). A case C is a tuple (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) such
that
– df is a formula that we call the decision formula of C.
– CaseDesc is a formula describing the case’s circumstances.
– ProofTree is a (finite) tree consisting of formulas f where the formula of the
root node is df. Inner nodes are annotated with AND or OR and leaves are
annotated with l ∈ {Axiom,Assess} ∪ {Ref(i) | i ∈ CI}. Leaf formulas l are
additionally associated with a prerequisite formula pre. For leaves annotated
with Axiom, we require that pre = l.
– crt ∈ Courts.
For leaf formulas l, we refer to l as the node’s fact, and we will often write these
nodes as pre→ fact where fact = l.
By the prerequisites of an inner node n with children nodes n1, . . . , nk,
denoted as pres(n), we refer to
∨
1≤i≤k pres(ni) if n is annotated by OR and∧
1≤i≤k pres(ni) if n is annotated by AND. The prerequisites of a case C are the
prerequisites of the root node and denoted by presC. We define analogously the
facts of a node and a case. We will often identify formulas with proof tree nodes.
Given a case C, by dfC we denote the decision formula of C.
Let C be a set of cases and µ : C → CI a function. If for every reference
Ref(i) in C, there is an D ∈ C with µ(D) = i, we call the set C closed under µ.
We assume world knowledge common to all cases. In the example of argumen-
tation ends in Section 2, it is assumed that the reader knows that the predicate
is judical process holds for any case. Formally, the world knowledge is a formula
KBW (naturally, a conjunction of world properties) in the underlying logic.
Definition 1 is purely syntactic, imposing no restrictions on how the different
elements are intended to behave. We will fill in these restrictions one by one as
part of spelling out the details of our framework, forcing cases to actually decide
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a conflict and behave according to the legal principles. One thing the reader
should keep in mind is that pre → fact is not intended as a logical implication.
Rather, pre are the prerequisites that a judge took into account when making
the assessment that fact (e.g., the privacy status of a piece of information) is
considered to be true under the circumstances CaseDesc |= pre. The pre → fact
dependencies thus model the human element in case law, which we consider to
be outside of what we can capture with formal logic. This solely captures human
decisions such as trade-off decisions. However, the frameworks allows reasoning
about consequence of such decisions. The formulas presC , and respectively factsC ,
collect all prerequisites needed to apply the proof tree, and respectively all facts
needed to execute the proof tree; axiom leaves act in both roles.
In principle, a case has the purpose to decide a formula df. However, while
justifying that a formula holds, e.g., that a telecommunication company has to
delete connection data after a certain amount of time, the court might decide
other essential subquestions. In the given example, this could be that connection
data is personal data. This concept is conveniently captured through the notion
of subcases.
Definition 2 (Subcase). Let C = (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) be a case and
n ∈ ProofTree a node. Let sub(n) be the subtree of ProofTree with root node n.
The case sub(C, n) := (n,CaseDesc, sub(n), crt) is a subcase of C.
Another aspect that is of interest when referencing cases is the degree of
abstraction. For example, one case could decide that a specific telecommunica-
tion company C has to delete connection information D of some user U after a
specific time period t. The question of how this decision can be used in order
to decide the question for different companies C′ or different information D′ is
covered by the legal concept of material difference. For this work, we assume
that a judge specifies the allowed difference in the prerequisites of a decision.
However, it could also be modeled by introducing metrics and thresholds when
referencing (sub-)cases.
Our definition of cases, so far, is generic in the sense that it may be applied
to any domain of law. To configure our framework to privacy regulations more
specifically, a natural approach is to simply restrict the permissible forms of
decision formulas. We explicitly leave out legal domains such as individualized
sentencing or measuring of damages. Decisions in the privacy context are about
whether or not a particular action is legal when executed on particular data. We
capture this by assuming a dedicated predicate is legal action, and restricting the
decision formula to be an atomic predicate of the form is legal action(a), where a
is an action from an underlying set Actions of possible actions treated as objects
(constants) in the underlying logic. This can also be used in other legal domains,
but it turns out to be sufficient to connect our formalization of privacy cases with
other policy based approaches. Note that, in contrast to other policy frameworks,
we do not need to add the context to the predicate, as the context is contained
in the case, via nodes of the form “if the transfer-action a has purpose marketing
and the receiver is a third party, then ¬is legal action(a)”. As decisions about the
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legality of actions are not naturally part of the common world knowledge KBW ,
nor of the case description CaseDesc itself, our modeling decision is to disallow
the use of is legal action predicates in these formulas. In other words, the world
and case context describe the circumstances which are relevant to determining
action legality, but they do not themselves define whether or not an action is
legal. This yields the following definition:
Definition 3 (Privacy Case). Given world knowledge KBW and action set
Actions, a case C = (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) is a privacy case if df ∈
{¬is legal action(a), is legal action(a)} for some action a ∈ Actions, where the
is legal action predicate is not used in either of KBW or CaseDesc.
Starting to fill in the intended semantics of cases, i.e., of the structures allowed
as per Definition 1, we first capture the essential properties a case needs to
have to “make sense” as a stand-alone structure. Additional properties regarding
cross-case structures will be considered in the next subsection. We will use the
word “consistency” to denote this kind of property. The following definition
captures the intentions behind cases:
Definition 4 (Case Consistency). Let C = (df, CaseDesc, ProofTree, crt) be
a case. C is consistent if the following holds (for all nodes n where n1, . . . , nk
are its child nodes)
(i) KBW ∧ CaseDesc 6|= ⊥ (ii) KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= presC
(iii) KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧ factsC 6|= ⊥
(iv)
∧
1≤i≤k
ni |= n if n is an AND step and
∨
1≤i≤k ni |= n if n is an OR step
Regarding (i), if the world knowledge contradicts the case description, i.e.,
KBW∧CaseDesc |= ⊥, then the case could not have happened in reality. Similarly,
(iii) the case context must not contradict the facts that the proof tree makes use
of (this subsumes (i), which we kept as it makes the definition more readable).
As for (ii), the case context must imply the axioms as well as the prerequisites
which the present judge (assessments) or other judges (references to other cases;
see also Definition 7) assumed to conclude these facts. (iv) says that inner nodes
must represent conclusions drawn from their children (remember here that ni,
for leaf nodes pre→ fact, refers to fact).
The OR nodes of the proof tree reflect the legal argumentation structure of
independent decision grounds, the judge gives several arguments, each of which
is sufficient. If the judge of a later case decides that one of these arguments is
invalid for the conclusion, he needs to be able to falsify only one of the branches
and not the whole tree. In other words, the tree structure gives “syntactic sugar”
that makes it possible to reflect the justification more closely and thereby marks
which subsets of leaf nodes are sufficient in order to reach decision df.
3.2 Combining Cases to Case Law Databases
The quintessential property of case law is that cases make references to other
cases. These references are necessary to formulate several legal principles of Sec-
tion 2.
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The legal principles false material difference and reversing decisions define
requirements for when not to reference a case, either because it contains a mistake
or because the opinion has changed over time. Therefore, we consider the design
cleaner if both principles are covered by the same mechanism of the framework.
There are several options to model the principles: first, the reversed decision
could be covered by time, i.e., by a requirement to refer to the newest case that
is applicable regarding the circumstances. However, the false material difference
cannot be covered by that. Another approach is to denote single Assess nodes
as unwarranted, i.e., to forbid the reference to be used thereafter. This solution
can model both principles false material difference and reversing decisions. We
explicitly decided to model the mechanism of unwarranted nodes outside of the
cases. Assume a case would decide that another decision was unwarranted. This
leads to another decision that could potentially be marked as unwarranted later
on implying that it is again correct to cite the case. Consequently, this would
lead to a set of time intervals during which the citation of nodes is warranted.
However, after legal consultation we figure out that this complication does not
meet practice, i.e., once a decision is unwarranted it will not become warranted
again; hence we simplified the mechanism.
We require a different mechanism to differentiate cases we must agree with
and cases which we may use as reference. Unwarranting rather defines which
decisions must not be referenced. In particular, we need to differentiate between
assessments coming from the legal principles ratio decidendi and obiter dicta.
While the part of the decision following ratio decidendi leads to a binding prece-
dent, the obiter dicta part is not binding. Thus, we introduce predicates may-ref
and must-agree. It also provides a mechanisms to respect the court hierarchy. In-
tuitively, may-ref(C1, C2) denotes the circumstances that case C1 may reference
case C2; must-agree(C1, C2) analogously denotes that C1 must agree with C2.
In addition, we need to introduce the concept of time by a total order ≤t
over cases. This concept allows us to formulate the requirement that references
can only point to the past. Using all these constructs, we can define a case law
database.
Definition 5 (Case Law Database (CLD)). A case law database is a tuple
DB = (C,≤t,must-agree,may-ref, µ, U) such that:
– C is a set of cases. We will also write C ∈ DB for C ∈ C.
– µ : C → CI is an injective function such that C is closed under µ. In the
following we will also write Ref(D) for Ref(i) if µ(D) = i.
– Let <ref := {(C,D) | D contains a Ref(C) node} and ≤t is an order that we
call time order of the cases. It has to hold:
must-agree ⊆
may-ref ⊆≤t⊆ C×C<ref⊆
– U specifies the unwarranted nodes, i.e., U : C→ N is function such that
• N is a subset of the nodes labelled with Assess or Ref in the cases C.
• The set increases monotonic, i.e., C ≤t D =⇒ U(C) ⊆ U(D).
We denote the unwarranted nodes of DB by U(DB) :=
⋃
C∈C U(C).
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The function µ is used to remove the recursive definition of a case and enables
us to connect cases via their individual semantics.
Regarding the relations must-agree and the may-ref we made two design de-
cisions. First, we require to not link must-agree and the actual references <ref.
On the one hand, there might be precedents which are not applicable, but on
the other hand, we want the freedom to define must-agree and may-ref only
depending on the court hierarchy, i.e., independent of the satisfaction of some
precedent’s preconditions. The second design decision is to base these relations
on cases instead of decision nodes. As for the first decision, the purpose is to
make an instantiation of the definition only depending on the court, but we need
to be careful regarding the principles ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Since one
of them is not binding, i.e., a must-agree and the other is. This differentiation
can be achieved by replacing every case with a set of cases. We require this to
be part of the modeling process.However, it is possible to automatically identify
parts of the proof that are optional to reach the final decision in the root node.
We did not add further restrictions since they may depend on local law.
For example, there is a vertical stare decisis in US law, implying that higher
court decisions have to be considered. There is also the term of horizontal stare
decisis that requires respecting siblings in the hierarchy. This principle does not
necessarily hold, but is under discussion. However, the definition of must- and
may-references allows modeling both.
Example 1 (Must-agree and may-references for a court hierarchy). As-
sume the set of courts Courts is partially ordered by ≤§, i.e., there
is a court hierarchy. In this case, we could model must-agree by
must-agree = {(C1, C2) | Ci = (dfi, di, pi, crti), i ∈ {1, 2}, C1 ≤t C2,
and crt1 ≤§ crt2}.
It is easy to see that the must-agree predicate actually only depends on the
crt and not on the other parameters of the proof. We call this property court-
dependency.
The key property of unwarranted decisions is that they are time dependent.
In order to only use warranted decisions when referencing, we define warranted
subcases as follows:
Definition 6 (Warranted Subcase). A subcase (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt)
is warranted with respect to a set N of nodes if the case
(df,CaseDesc,ProofTree′, crt) is consistent where ProofTree′ is derived from
ProofTree by replacing every precondition of a node n ∈ N by ⊥.
It remains to define when a case law database can be considered to be con-
sistent. To that end, we consider case references and conflicts between cases.
Starting with the former, we obtain:
Definition 7 (Correct Case Reference). Let DB be a case law database and
C = (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) a case in DB. A leaf node pre → fact in
ProofTree annoted with Ref(D) references correctly if Du = (fact, CaseDescD,
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ProofTreeD, crtD) is a warranted subcase of a case D ∈ DB w.r.t. U(C),
may-ref(C,D) holds and KBW ∧ pre |= presD. C references correctly if all its
leaves annoted with Ref(D) reference correctly.
Consider that, when referencing a (sub)case D as pre → fact from our case
C at hand, we are essentially saying that the same argumentation applied in D
can be applied in our case, to prove fact under circumstances pre. So we need to
show that this applicability of arguments is actually given. This is ensured by
KBW∧pre |= presD because presD collects all prerequisites, axioms and otherwise,
needed to apply D. Note that, if C is consistent, by Definition 4 (ii) it holds that
KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= pre and thus KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= presD. Note further that
KBW ∧ pre |= presD defines the role of pre as providing a condition sufficient
to entail “the other judge’s prerequisites”. As the same applies recursively to
the case references made in D, we know that pre (given KBW and CaseDesc)
entails all judge decisions underlying the assessment fact. We will formalize this
in Theorem 2.
We are now almost in the position to define consistency at the level of the
entire case law database. The last missing piece in the puzzle is to identify when
cases should be considered to be in conflict — which naturally occurs in case
law databases where different judges may make different decisions. We capture
this through pairs of cases whose prerequisites are compatible, while their facts
are contradictory:
Definition 8 (Case Conflict). Let C1 be a case in DB and C2 be a warranted
case w.r.t. U(C1). We say that C1 is in conflict with C2 if and only if
(i) KBW ∧ presC1 ∧ presC2 6|= ⊥ (ii) KBW ∧ factsC1 ∧ factsC2 |= ⊥
(iii) must-agree(C1, C2)
A case C is in conflict with DB if there is a D ∈ DB s.t. C is in conflict with D.
We ignore the case descriptions here, other than what is explicitly employed
as axioms in the proof trees: we consider cases to be in conflict if one could
construct a case (e.g., presC1 ∧ presC2) which would make it possible to come to
a contradictory decision. We define case law database consistency as follows:
Definition 9 (Case law database consistency). A case law database DB =
(C,≤t,must-agree,may-ref, µ, U) is
(i) case-wise consistent if every C ∈ DB is consistent,
(ii) referentially consistent if every C ∈ DB references correctly, and
(iii) hierarchically consistent if every C ∈ DB is not in conflict with DB.
(iv) warrants consistently if for every C holds: U(C) contains all Ref(D) nodes
where D is an unwarranted subcase w.r.t. U(C).
We call DB consistent if it warrants consistently and is hierarchically, referen-
tially and case-wise consistent.
3.3 Deriving Legal Consequences: Deducibility and Permissibility
In the following we assume that the predicates may-ref and must-agree of the DB
do not depend on the case description, the decision formula or the proof tree, but
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are only court dependent, cf. Example 1. As a consequence, we know the value of
these predicates for formula values and case descriptions which are not contained
as a case in the database given only the court level of the case. In other words, we
require an operation DB∪ {C} that puts C at the end of the timeline regarding
≤t, assigns a fresh identifier i ∈ CI to C with µ, uses as U(C) := U(DB),
and adopts must-agree,may-ref appropriately and is independent of the decision
formula and the proof tree. This operation is needed to apply the framework to
situations not contained in the database.
Obvious applications of our framework are advanced support for case search
(based on logic operations over the case descriptions, decision formulas, etc.),
and consistency checking (given a case C, is C consistent and does it reference
correctly?). A more advanced task is to evaluate the legality of actions given
the cases reflected in the database. For example, when designing a course ad-
ministration system, one may ask “Am I allowed to store students’ grades in
the system?” Our formalism supports this kind of question at different levels of
strength, namely:
Definition 10 (Deducibility and Permissibility). Let DB = (C,≤t
,must-agree,may-ref, µ, U) be a consistent CLD, and f a formula. We say that f
is permitted in DB under circumstances CaseDesc and court crt if there exists a
case C = (f,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) such that ProofTree does not contain nodes
labeled with Assess, and DB ∪ {C} is consistent (where C is inserted at the end
of the timeline ≤t). We say that f is uncontradicted in DB under CaseDesc and
crt if ¬f is not permitted under CaseDesc and crt. We say that f is deducible if
it is permitted and uncontradicted.
For sets F of formulas, we say that F is permitted in DB under CaseDesc
and crt if there exists a set of cases {Cf = (f,CaseDesc,ProofTreef , crt) | f ∈
F} such that every ProofTreef does not contain nodes labeled with Assess, and
DB ∪ {Cf | f ∈ F} is consistent (where the Cf are inserted in any order at the
end of the timeline ≤t).
It might be confusing at first why we attach to f the weak attribute of being
“permitted” if we can construct a case supporting it. The issue is, both f and
¬f may have such support in the same database. This follows directly from the
freedom of different courts to contradict each other. If two courts at the same
level decide differently on the same issue, then that is fine by our assumptions.
Hence, to qualify a formula f for the strong attribute of being “deducible”, we
require the database to permit f and to not permit its contradiction.
Note that permissibility and deducibility are also dependent on the circum-
stances CaseDesc and the court crt. For example, when we answer “was it legal
to send data D to party P?”, it matters for which purpose the data was sent.
That information is contained in the CaseDesc. The court level has several in-
terpretations here: the court might be chosen to match the local court of the
party asking the question. But the court level can also be viewed as a level of
confidence. Permissibility is a “stronger” guarantee for lower court instances,
because we can then deduce without incurring conflicts to instances higher up.
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Hence lower court instances can be used to obtain permissibility “with high
confidence”, and contradictions “with low confidence”. Vice versa, higher court
instances can be used to obtain permissibility “with low confidence” and con-
tradictions “with high confidence”.
The concept of deducibility of a set F of formulas is interesting because, in
general, this is not the same as deducing each formula in separation. In partic-
ular, while each of f and ¬f may be permitted in the same database, {f,¬f}
is never permitted because adding the hypothetical supporting cases necessarily
incurs a hierarchical conflict. Permissibility of F is also not the same as per-
missibility of
∧
f∈F f because the latter makes a stronger assumption: all cases
referred to in order to conclude
∧
f∈F f must have compatible prerequisites.
So deducibility of formula sets forms a middle ground between individual and
conjunctive deducibility.
Theorem 1. There is a consistent case law database DB, case description
CaseDesc and court crt, such that there is a set F of formulas for each of the
following properties (in DB under circumstances CaseDesc and court crt):
(i) For every f ∈ F , f is permissible and F is not permissible.
(ii) F is permissible, but
∧
f∈F f is not permissible.
This theorem’s proof and the details of all other proofs are given in the Ap-
pendix B.
Characterizing Deducibility. Deducibility is the central concept for answer-
ing questions that are not explicitly answered by the database. However, Def-
inition 10 does not give an algorithmic description of how to decide whether
some formula is deducible. It is also inconvenient for proving properties about
permissibility and deducibility. Thus, we give an equivalent characterization in
the following.
Intuitively, a formula should be permissible if there is a set of warranted
decisions which allow us to conclude the predicate and a formula f should be
deducible if in addition no set of decisions contradicts f . We will first define
supporting sets and then prove that the intuition matches the definitions of
permissibility and deducibility.
Definition 11 (Supporting set). Let DB = (C,≤t,must-agree,may-ref, µ, U)
be a consistent case law database, f a formula, CaseDesc a case description
and crt a court. A set A of leaf nodes in DB that are labeled with Assess is a
supporting set for formula f if the following holds:
(1) KBW ∧ CaseDesc |=
∧
(pre→fact)∈A pre
(2) KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧
∧
(pre→fact)∈A fact |= f
(3) KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧
∧
(pre→fact)∈A fact 6|= ⊥
A supporting set is unwarranted if it contains an unwarranted node w.r.t. any
C ∈ C. If it is not unwarranted it is warranted.
A supporting set is consistent with DB if DB∪ {(⊤,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt)} is
consistent, where ProofTree consists of a root node with annotation ⊤ and leaf
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nodes with annotation Ref(Cn) for n ∈ A, where Cn is the case that contains
node n.
Note that a supporting set that is consistent with the DB leads to consis-
tency, and correct referencing, and does not create any conflicts. The properties
required in the definition are a consequence of the definition of database con-
sistency. A case constructed from a supporting set would simply refer to all
decisions and place the formula at the root. Case consistency requires the prop-
erties (1)-(3) to hold; referential consistency requires that the referenced leaf
nodes are warranted and hierarchical consistency requires that the supporting
set is not in conflict with DB.
The following theorem characterizes permissibility and deducibility using
supporting sets. This characterization suggests an algorithmic way of deciding
the properties and gives a tool for proving properties about case law databases.
Theorem 2. Let DB be a consistent case law database, f a formula, CaseDesc
a case description and crt a court. The following holds:
1. C ∈ DB with warranted node f ⇒ ∃A that supports f
2. f is permitted (under circumstance CaseDesc and court crt) ⇔ ∃A that
supports f , is warranted, and is consistent with DB
3. f is deducible ⇔ ∃A that supports f and is consistent with DB, and ∀B it
holds that B does not support ¬f , is unwarranted, or is not consistent with
DB
3.4 General Properties of Case Law Databases
Introducing a new framework always comes with the risk of modeling errors.
A method for alleviating that risk is to prove properties that the framework
is expected to have. In order to validate the framework introduced here, we
have proven that (i) case references do not influence decisions (Theorem 2);
in this subsection we additionally prove that (ii) consistency is necessary for
property (i) (Theorem 3), and that (iii) neither ⊥ nor {f,¬f} are ever permitted
(Theorem 4).
Regarding (i), we have shown that every formula f in the database can be
derived from a supporting set of previous decisions (Theorem 2) with the case
description and world knowledge. Hence there is no possible interplay between
case references that would make it possible to prove something not backed up
by judges’ decisions.
Regarding (ii), Theorem 2 implies immediately that, whenever a formula f
is deducible, then it follows from decisions made by judges in previous cases. It
is easy to verify that our restrictions are necessary to ensure this, i.e., that this
property gets lost if we forsake either case-wise or referential consistency:
Theorem 3. Let DB be a case law database, and let f be any formula that does
not entail ⊥. Then there exist cases C1 and C2, each with root node f and the
empty case desc ⊤, such that (inserting Ci at the end of the timeline ≤t):
– If DB is case-wise consistent, then so is DB ∪ {C1}.
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– If DB is referentially consistent, then so is DB ∪ {C2}.
– If there is a crt such that must-agree(crt) = ∅, then in addition this holds:
for each of i = 1, 2, if DB is hierarchically consistent, then so is DB ∪ {Ci}.
We remark that, by restricting the formula f only slightly, the proof of The-
orem 3 can be strengthened so as not to have to rely on a maximal court for
ensuring hierarchical consistency. In particular, if f is made of predicates that
do not occur anywhere in the case law database, then the cases C1 and C2 as
constructed cannot be in conflict with any other cases, thus preserving hierarchi-
cal consistency for arbitrary courts crt. We finally prove (iii), non-permissibility
of either ⊥ or {f,¬f}:
Theorem 4. The formula ⊥ is not permitted in any case law database DB,
under any circumstances CaseDesc and court crt. The same holds for {f,¬f} if
crt ∈ must-agree(crt).
3.5 Privacy Cases and Norms
We now point out an interesting property of privacy cases, and of case law
databases consisting only of privacy cases. We call such databases privacy case
law databases.
Rule based privacy policies are a well established and widely used concept.
The rules that are used are usually reflected by norms defining privacy regula-
tions. However, neither rules nor norms are reflected in the case law framework.
In this subsection, we show that we can use a natural definition of norms that
can be extracted from privacy cases. In addition, it is possible to transform a
privacy case to a normal form such that a norm that decides the case is repre-
sented. Consequently, we also consider norm extraction as a reasoning task in
Section 4.
At the core of privacy regulations are positive and negative norms, as in-
troduced by [10]. Positive norms are permissive in the sense that they describe
conditions that allow transactions with personal data (φ ⇒ is legal action(a)).
Negative norms, in contrast, define necessary conditions for such transactions,
i.e., they forbid transactions with personal data unless certain conditions are
met (φ ⇒ ¬is legal action(a)). We formulate negative norms as conditions that
lead to the denial of transactions.
Definition 12 (Norms). Let a ∈ Actions. A norm is a formula that has the
form φ⇒ p where is legal action(a) does not occur in φ. The norm is a positive
norm, denoted φ+, if p = is legal action(a) and a negative norm, denoted φ−, if
p = ¬is legal action(a). A norm φ decides p given f if KBW ∧ f |= φ.
In the case law framework, norms are hidden by judges’ assessments. How-
ever, in the spirit of Theorem 2, norms are reflected by sets of cases that could
be referenced in order to support either the legality of an action (positive norm)
or its illegality (negative norm). In the following theorem, we show that we can
extract a norm for every privacy case avoiding the recursion of Theorem 2.
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Theorem 5. Let DB be a consistent privacy case law database and
C = (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) ∈ DB. Then there is a norm
φ that decides df given CaseDesc. In particular, there are formulas
φW , φS such that is legal action(a) does not occur in these formulas and
(1) factsC ⇒ φW ∧ (φS ⇒ df) (2) φW ∧ (φS ⇒ df)⇒ df
The formulas φW and φS can be used to construct a normal form of privacy
cases. In particular, this normal form is consistent and allows reading off norms.
Corollary 1 (Normal forms). Let DB = (C,≤t,must-agree,may-ref, µ, U) be
a privacy case law database, C = (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) ∈ DB be a case,
and D be the set of C’s leaf nodes. N(C) is the case that consists of a root
node df, two inner nodes φw and φS ⇒ df and the leaf nodes D as children of
both inner nodes. We call N(C) the normal form of C. If DB is consistent, then
(C\{C} ∪ {N(C)},≤t) is also consistent (where N(C) is placed at the position
of C w.r.t. ≤t).
In order to define N(C), we need to duplicate the leaf nodes since the trans-
formations to get φW and φS ignore which fact is needed to get the corresponding
formula. Thus, a leaf node’s fact could end up in both formulas φW and φS .
In conformance with [10], we can conclude from deducibility of an action that
there is a positive norm supporting it and show that no negative norm can be
applied, i.e., all negative norms are respected (Theorem 4).
4 Reasoning Tasks
We now discuss the reasoning tasks associated with our framework — how to
answer questions such as “are we allowed to send data D to some party P?”
— in more detail, giving an algorithm sketch and brief complexity analysis (in
terms of the number of reasoning operations required) for each.
Consistency. Analyzing and keeping the state of the case law database consis-
tent is of vital importance for its usefulness; cf. Theorem 4. As in the definition of
consistency, we split the task of checking consistency into case-wise, referential,
and hierarchical consistency. Due to their simplicity, we postpone the detailed
description of their algorithms to the appendix.
All of these properties are defined per case, i.e., the case wise check of the
corresponding property has to be repeated |DB| times. Following the respective
definition, checking case consistency costs |ProofTree+ 1| entailment operations
and checking correct referencing for C costs references(C) where references(C) is
the number of nodes in C annotated by Ref(D). Hierarchical consistency can be
checked along the time line ≤t only testing for conflicts with earlier cases. So for
the i-th case, we need at most (i − 1) · 2 entailment checks, since every conflict
check requires 2. Consequently, we require |DB| · (|DB|+ 1) entailment checks.
The property whether the case law database warrants consistently can be
checked using one entailment test per reference to a subcase containing an un-
warranted decisions node.
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Deducibility and Permissibility. As deducibility amounts to two consecutive
permissibility checks, we consider the latter exclusively. We are given a database
DB, a formula whose permissibility should be checked, as well as a case de-
scription CaseDesc and a court crt forming the circumstances.By Theorem 2,
permissibility is equivalent to the existence of a supporting set A for f that
is consistent with the database. Thus the task of permissibility, i.e., giving a
“yes” vs. “no” answer, can be reduced to checking the existence of a suitable
set A. If the answer is “yes”, we can also output a witness, i.e., a hypothet-
ical case C showing permissibility. A straightforward means for doing this is
to set C := (f,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) where ProofTree consists of root node
f , one leaf node l labeled with Ref(D) for every D ∈ A, as well as one leaf
node KBW ∧ CaseDesc labeled with Axiom. For convenience, we will denote this
construction by C(A). See Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Permissibility
Input : A formula f , case description CaseDesc, court crt, and a consistent
CLD DB
Output: A case C = (f,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) such that DB ∪ {C} is
consistent (where C is set to be the maximum w.r.t. ≤t), or ⊥ if no
such C exists
1 Test whether KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= ⊥. If so, output ⊥.
2 Test whether KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= f . If so, output
(f,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) where ProofTree is the proof tree consisting of a
leaf node labeled by Axiom containing f .
3 Set N := ∅.
4 for every D ∈ DB and every (pre→ fact) ∈ D labeled Assess do
5 Check if KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= pre
6 Check if KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧ fact 6|= ⊥
7 If both checks succeed, set N := N ∪ {(pre→ fact)}.
8 end
9 for A ∈ 2N do
10 Check that KBW ∧ CaseDesc |=
∧
(pre→fact)∈A pre
11 Check that KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧
∧
(pre→fact)∈A fact |= f
12 Check that KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧
∧
(pre→fact)∈A fact 6|= ⊥
13 for every E ∈ DB with crt <§ crtE do
14 Check that E and C(A) are not in conflict (cf. Algorithm 4).
15 end
16 If all three tests succeed, go on with step 18, otherwise continue with
the next D.
17 end
18 If a set A succeeded, output C(A), otherwise output ⊥.
The correctness of the algorithm is shown by Theorem 2; lines 10-12 check
that the set supports f and lines 13-15 ensure that it is consistent with the
database. In contrast to our previous algorithms, deducibility checking as per
Algorithm 1 requires an exponential number of entailment checks in the worst
case (a trivial bound is in the order of 2N whereN is the number of decision nodes
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in the database). This raises the questions (1) whether or not this exponential
overhead is inherent in the complexity of deciding permissibility, and (2) whether
it is possible to encode the permissibility test directly into the logic instead. In
what follows, we shed some light on (1) and (2).
The answer to (1) is a qualified “yes” in the sense that permissibility checking
essentially pre-fixes entailment checks with an existential quantifier. As entail-
ment checks correspond to universal quantification, this intuitively means that
for permissibility we need to test the validity of a ∃∀ formula, instead of a ∀
formula for entailment. So we add a quantifier alternation step, which typically
does come at the price of increased complexity. This line of thought also imme-
diately provides an intuitive answer to question (2), namely “yes but only if the
underlying logic contains ∃∀ quantification”.
Of course, both these answers are only approximate and only speak in broad
terms. Whether each is to be answered with “yes” or “no” depends on the precise
form of the logic, and on what kind of blow-up we are willing to tolerate. To
make matters concrete, we now consider three particular logics, namely first-
order predicate logic, description logic (more specifically a particular version
of ALC) and propositional logic (i.e., first-order predicate logic given a finite
universe and without quantification). We start with the latter.
In what follows, say we need to check whether formula f is permitted in
DB under circumstances CaseDesc. We abstract from the complications entailed
by maintaining hierarchical consistency, and assume that for crt, it holds that
must-agree(crt) = ∅.
Theorem 6. For propositional logic, deciding permissibility is Σp2 -complete.
Proof sketch. The set Σp2 = NP
NP, so containment is shown by guessing a
supporting set and verifying its properties using an NP oracle. For the hardness
we encode an QBF formula ∃x∀y : φ(x, y) in permissibility request for case law
database. We do this by encoding all possible values for x in the database and
asking for the permissibility of φ(x, y). Details can be found in Appendix B.7.
As entailment testing in propositional logic is only coNP-complete, Theo-
rem 6 answers question (1) with “yes”, and answers question (2) with “no, unless
we are willing to tolerate worst-case exponentially large formulas”. Unsurpris-
ingly, the answers for first-order logic are different:
Theorem 7. Permissibility is equivalent to satisfiability of a formula whose size
is polynomial in the size of DB, CaseDesc, and f for
(1) first-order logic.
(2) the description logic ALC with concept constructors fills and one-of by role
constructors role-and, role-not, product, and inverse.7
Proof sketch. The result in [14] shows equality of expressivity of first-order logic
with at most two free variables. Thus we construct a suitable formula for the
7 For details on this instance of ALC, please consult [14].
19
first part. We do this by using existantial quantification in order to choose a
warranted supporting set and then design the formula such that it is satisfiable
if and only if the consistency properties of the case holds that can be constructed
from that supporting set (i.e., the case potentially output by Algorithm 1). All
parts that are not choosen by the existantial quantifier will be equivalent to ⊤.
Details can be found in Appendix B.8.
Norm extraction. As seen in Section 3.5, privacy cases induce normative rules.
The format of rules gives the advantage that these are easy to enforce and bridge
the gap towards privacy policies. As shown by Theorem 5 we extract a norm
for every case in the database. The assumption is that the case is consistent
with respect to an underlying consistent privacy case law database DB. The
algorithm is postponed to the appendix (Algorithm 5). It basically turns the
proof of Theorem 5 into an algorithm transforming the logical formula of the
case’s facts.
Let f be the size of the biggest formula in the leaves of C and n the number
of nodes in C. Then the size of the norm can become O(2f · n + |preC |). The
computation needs operations linear in that size. However, there is no need for
any operations to decide |= in order to solve this reasoning task.
5 Logic Selection
For modeling purposes — naturally modeling the background knowledge base,
the detailed aspects characterizing a case description, and the reasoning applied
in arguments — as well as for computational purposes — effectively realizing
the desired reasoning tasks — the choice of logic is, of course, of paramount
importance. The only hard requirement (“must have”) that the logic, L, must
meet is:
(i) Sufficient expressivity to tackle our framework and reasoning tasks. Pre-
cisely, the minimal requirement is for L to provide a language LF for for-
mulas, with reasoning support for tests of the form (a)
∧
φ∈Φ |= ⊥ and (b)∧
φ∈Φ |= ψ: These are the only tests our reasoning tasks demand from the
underlying logic. If LF is closed under conjunction and contains ⊥ (as will
be the case in our logic of choice), the requirement simply becomes to be
able to test whether φ |= ψ.
The soft requirements (“nice to have”) on the logic are:
(ii) Suitable for modeling real-world phenomena and knowledge, ideally
an established paradigm for such modeling tasks.
(iii) Decidability, and as low complexity as possible, of the relevant rea-
soning (e.g., satisfiability checks; cf. (i)).
(iv) Effective tool support established and available.
What we have just outlined is essentially a “wanted poster” for description logic
(DL) [6]. This is a very well investigated family of fragments of first-order logic
(several decades of research in AI and related areas), whose mission statement
is to provide a language for modeling real-world phenomena and knowledge
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(ii), while retaining decidability and exploring the trade-off of expressivity vs.
complexity (iii). Effective tool support (iv) has been an active area for two
decades. Every DL provides a language to describe “axioms”, and even the most
restricted DLs (in particular, the DL-Lite family [16] which constitutes the “lower
extreme” of the DL complexity scale) make it possible to answer queries about
the truth of an axiom relative to a conjunction of axioms, which is exactly the
test we require.
To make things concrete, we briefly consider the description logic attributive
concept language with complements, for shortALC, which was introduced in 1991
[34],8 and is widely regarded as the canonical “basic” description logic variant
(most other DLs extend ALC, in a variety of directions). Description logic is a
form of predicate logic that considers only 1-ary and 2-ary predicates, referred
to as concepts and roles, respectively. Assuming a set NC of concept names and
a set NR of role names, DL makes it possible to construct complex concepts,
which correspond to a particular subset of predicate-logic formulas with exactly
one free variable. For ALC, the set of complex concepts is the smallest set such
that
1. ⊤,⊥ and every concept name A ∈ NC are complex concepts, and
2. if C and D are complex concepts and r ∈ NR, then C ⊓D, C ⊔D, ¬C, ∀r.C,
and ∃r.C are complex concepts.
Here, ⊓ denotes concept intersection (logical conjunction), ⊔ denotes concept
union (logical disjunction), and ¬C denotes concept complement (logical nega-
tion). ∀r.C collects the set of all objects x such that, whenever x stands in
relation r to y, y ∈ C. Similarly, ∃r.C collects the set of all objects x such that
there exists y where x stands in relation r to y and y ∈ C.
ALC allows concept inclusion axioms, of the form C ⊑ D, where C,D are
complex concepts, meaning that C is a subset of D (universally quantified logical
implication). ALC furthermore allows assertional axioms, of the form x : C or
(x, y) : r, where C is a complex concept, r is a role, and x and y are individual
names (i.e., constants). An ALC knowledge base consists of finite sets of concept
inclusion axioms and assertional axioms (called the TBox and ABox respec-
tively), interpreted as conjunctions. The basic reasoning services provided by
ALC (and most other DLs) are testing whether a knowledge base KB is satisfi-
able, and testing whether KB |= φ where φ is an axiom. These decision problems
are decidable, and more precisely, ExpTime-complete for ALC. (In some DL-Lite
variants, the decision problems are in NP, or even polynomial-time solvable.)
For our purposes, we can assume as our formulas LF conjunctions of axioms,
i.e., the smallest set that contains⊥, all axioms of the underlying DL (e.g.,ALC),
as well as φ∧ψ if φ and ψ are members of LF . In order to test whether φ |= ψ, we
then simply call the DL reasoning service “φ |= ψi?” for every conjunct ψi of ψ
and return “yes” iff all these calls did. In other words, we may use conjunctions
of DL axioms in the knowledge base, case descriptions, and proof tree nodes.
8 For a comprehensive overview of current techniques and results regarding ALC, see
[7].
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced PriCL, the first framework for automated reasoning
about case law. We showed that it complies with natural requirements of con-
sistency and tailored the framework for privacy case law. Moreover, we showed
a tight connection between privacy case law and the notion of norms that un-
derlies existing rule-based privacy research. We identified the major reasoning
tasks such as checking the case law database for consistency, extracting norms
and deducing whether an action is legal or not. For all these tasks, we gave al-
gorithms deciding them and we did an analysis that leads to ALC as a suitable
instantiation for the logic. In particular, ALC provides efficient realizations while
being sufficiently expressive and suitable for modeling real-world phenomena and
knowledge.
For future research, we need to construct a significantly large data base con-
sisting of real world cases. Here, the challenge is to differentiate between state-
ments made as world knowledge statement, those made because of the case
descriptions and those referenced. The reason for this is that there is no clean
language-wise separation in the argumentation.
Acknowledgements.We want to thank the anonymous reviewer for their valu-
able feedback. We tried to incorporate the feedback as much as possible.
This work was supported by the German Ministry for Education and Re-
search (BMBF) through funding for the Center for IT-Security, Privacy and
Accountability (CISPA).
References
1. A. Anderson. A comparison of two privacy policy languages: EPAL and XACML.
2005.
2. G. J. Annas. Hipaa regulations-a new era of medical-record privacy? New England
Journal of Medicine, 348(15):1486–1490, 2003.
3. A. I. Anto´n, E. Bertino, N. Li, and T. Yu. A roadmap for comprehensive online
privacy policy management. Communications of the ACM, 50(7):109–116, 2007.
4. P. Ashley. Enforcement of a p3p privacy policy. In AISM, pages 11–26. Citeseer,
2004.
5. P. Ashley, S. Hada, G. Karjoth, C. Powers, and M. Schunter. Enterprise privacy
authorization language (EPAL 1.2). Submission to W3C, 2003.
6. F. Baader, D. Calvanese, D. L. McGuinness, D. Nardi, and P. F. Patel-Schneider,
editors. The Description Logic Handbook: Theory, Implementation, and Applica-
tions. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
7. F. Baader, I. Horrocks, and U. Sattler. Description Logics. In Handbook of Knowl-
edge Representation, chapter 3, pages 135–180. Elsevier, 2008.
8. M. Backes, F. Bendun, J. Hoffman, and N. Marnau. Pricl: Creating a precedent.
a framework for reasoning about privacy case law.
9. M. Backes, G. Karjoth, W. Bagga, and M. Schunter. Efficient comparison of en-
terprise privacy policies. In Proc. of Symposium on Applied Computing, pages
375–382. ACM, 2004.
22
10. A. Barth, A. Datta, J. C. Mitchell, and H. Nissenbaum. Privacy and contextual
integrity: Framework and applications. In Proc. of S&P, pages 15–pp. IEEE, 2006.
11. A. Barth, J. C. Mitchell, A. Datta, and S. Sundaram. Privacy and utility in business
processes. CSF, 7:279–294, 2007.
12. D. Basin, F. Klaedtke, S. Marinovic, and E. Za˘linescu. Monitoring compliance
policies over incomplete and disagreeing logs. In Proc. of Runtime Verification,
pages 151–167. Springer, 2013.
13. D. A. Basin, F. Klaedtke, S. Mu¨ller, and B. Pfitzmann. Runtime monitoring of
metric first-order temporal properties. In Proc. of FSTTCS, pages 49–60, 2008.
14. A. Borgida. On the relative expressiveness of description logics and predicate
logics. Artificial intelligence, 82(1):353–367, 1996.
15. T. D. Breaux and A. I. Anto´n. Analyzing regulatory rules for privacy and security
requirements. IEEE Trans. on Software Engineering, 34(1):5–20, 2008.
16. D. Calvanese, G. De Giacomo, D. Lembo, M. Lenzerini, and R. Rosati. Tractable
reasoning and efficient query answering in description logics: The dl-lite family.
Journal of Automed Reasoning, 39(3):385–429, 2007.
17. A. Cavoukian. Privacy by design. Report of the Information & Privacy Commis-
sioner Ontario, Canada, 2012.
18. L. F. Cranor. P3p. Making Privacy Policies More Useful, IEEE Security &Privacy.
New York, pages 50–55, 2003.
19. A. Datta, J. Blocki, N. Christin, H. DeYoung, D. Garg, L. Jia, D. Kaynar, and
A. Sinha. Understanding and protecting privacy: formal semantics and principled
audit mechanisms. In Information Systems Security, pages 1–27. Springer, 2011.
20. H. DeYoung, D. Garg, D. Kaynar, and A. Datta. Logical specification of the glba
and hipaa privacy laws. CyLab, page 72, 2010.
21. C. Duma, A. Herzog, and N. Shahmehri. Privacy in the semantic web: What policy
languages have to offer. In Proc. of POLICY, pages 109–118. IEEE, 2007.
22. European Commission. General data protection regulation.
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf.
23. C. Flavia´n and M. Guinal´ıu. Consumer trust, perceived security and privacy policy:
three basic elements of loyalty to a web site. Industrial Management & Data
Systems, 106(5):601–620, 2006.
24. D. Garg, L. Jia, and A. Datta. Policy auditing over incomplete logs: theory, im-
plementation and applications. In Proc. of CCS, pages 151–162. ACM, 2011.
25. S. Gu¨rses, C. Gonzalez Troncoso, and C. Diaz. Engineering privacy by design.
Computers, Privacy & Data Protection, 2011.
26. J. Karat, C.-M. Karat, E. Bertino, N. Li, Q. Ni, C. Brodie, J. Lobo, S. Calo,
L. Cranor, P. Kumaraguru, and R. Reeder. Policy framework for security and
privacy management. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 53(2):4, 2009.
27. P. G. Kelley, J. Bresee, L. F. Cranor, and R. W. Reeder. A nutrition label for
privacy. In Proceedings of the 5th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security,
page 4. ACM, 2009.
28. R. La¨mmel and E. Pek. Understanding privacy policies. Empirical Software Engi-
neering, 18(2):310–374, 2013.
29. M. Maffei, K. Pecina, and M. Reinert. Security and privacy by declarative design.
In Proc. of CSF, pages 81–96. IEEE, 2013.
30. Q. Ni, E. Bertino, J. Lobo, C. Brodie, C.-M. Karat, J. Karat, and A. Trombeta.
Privacy-aware role-based access control. Proc. of TISSEC, 13(3):24, 2010.
31. Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Summary
of the HIPAA privacy rule, 2003.
32. S. E. Oh, J. Y. Chun, L. Jia, D. Garg, C. A. Gunter, and A. Datta. Privacy-
preserving audit for broker-based health information exchange. In Proc. of Data
and application security and privacy, pages 313–320. ACM, 2014.
33. F. Salim, N. P. Sheppard, and R. Safavi-Naini. Enforcing p3p policies using a
digital rights management system. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pages 200–
217. Springer, 2007.
34. M. Schmidt-Schauß and G. Smolka. Attributive concept descriptions with comple-
ments. Artificial Intelligence, 48(1):1–26, 1991.
35. S. Sen, S. Guha, A. Datta, S. K. Rajamani, J. Tsai, and J. M. Wing. Bootstrapping
privacy compliance in big data systems. In Proc. of S& P.
36. M. C. Tschantz, A. Datta, and J. M. Wing. Formalizing and enforcing purpose
restrictions in privacy policies. In Proc. of S& P, pages 176–190. IEEE, 2012.
37. United States Congress. Financial services modernization act of 1999, 2010.
38. United States federal law. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 1998.
A Postponed Algorithms for Reasoning Tasks
A.1 Database Consistency
Here, we present the algorithms for consistency that were postponed in Section 4.
Algorithm 2 can be used to decide case consistency, Algorihtm 3 can be used to
decide referential consistency and Algorithm 4 can be used to decide hierarchical
consistency.
Algorithm 2: Case consistency
Input : A case C = (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt)
Output: ⊤ if C is consistent and ⊥ otherwise
1 Check that KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= presC .
2 Check that KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧ factsC 6|= ⊥.
3 For every leaf node n in ProofTree labeled with Axiom, check that
KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= n.
4 For every inner node n in ProofTree annotated by AND with child nodes
n1, . . . , nk, check that
∧
1≤i≤k ni |= n.
5 For every inner node n in ProofTree annotated by OR with child nodes
n1, . . . , nk, check that
∨
1≤i≤k ni |= n.
6 If all checks succeed output ⊤; otherwise output ⊥.
A.2 Algorithm for Norm Extraction
Algorithm 5 can be used in order to extract a norm from a privacy case.
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Algorithm 3: Referential consistency
Input : A case C = (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) and a case law database DB
Output: ⊤ if C is referentially consistent w.r.t. DB and ⊥ otherwise
1 for every subcase D referenced by leaf node pre→ fact do
2 check that KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧ pre |= presD
3 end
4 If all checks succeed output ⊤; otherwise output ⊥.
Algorithm 4: Case-wise hierarchical consistency
Input : A case C = (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt) and a hierarchically
consistent CLD DB
Output: ⊤ if DB ∪ {C} is hierarchically consistent (where C is set to be the
maximum w.r.t. ≤t)
1 for every D ∈ DB for which crt <§ crtD do
2 check that KBW ∧ presC ∧ presD 6|= ⊥
3 check that KBW ∧ df ∧ dfD |= ⊥.
4 If both checks succeed output ⊥.
5 end
6 Output ⊤.
Algorithm 5: Norm extraction
Input : A case C = (df,CaseDesc,ProofTree, crt)
Output: A norm φ that decides df
1 phi := ⊤
2 for leaf node n in C do
3 φ := φ∧CNF(n)
4 end
5 Remove ¬df from φ
6 Remove all clauses not containing df
7 Remove df from φ
8 φ := pre
C
∧ ¬φ
9 Output φ
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B Postponed proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We define CaseDesc := A for a predicate A and consider the court set
Courts = {H11 , H
1
2 , H
2} such that Hi <§ Hj iff i < j implies must-agree and
may-ref as in example 1.
Let Assess(f) be a proof tree consisting of a single assessment node as root
node that contains ⊤ → f and, for a case C and a formula f , let Ref(C, f) be
the proof tree consisting of a single case reference node that refers to C and
contains the formula ⊤ → f . Let B 6= A be some predicate. The database DB
consists of the following cases:
– C1 = (p,⊤,Assess(p), H11 )
– C2 = (¬p,⊤,Assess(¬p), H12 )
– C3 = (A⇒ B,⊤,Assess(A⇒ B), H11 )
– C4 = (B ⇒ ¬A,⊤,Assess(B ⇒ ¬A), H12 )
The time order ≤t is given by < on the indices.
The database is obviously consistent. Let crt = H2.
1. Define the set F := {p,¬p}. The formula p is permitted by DB for case
description CaseDesc and court crt, since (p,CaseDesc,Ref(C1, p), crt) is a
case as required by Definition 10. The same holds for ¬p.
Assume that F is permitted. Then there are cases Cp, C¬p such that DB ∪
{Cp, C¬p} is consistent. However, Cp and C¬p are in conflict and are at the
same court level, i.e., eithermust-agree(Cp, C¬p) holds ormust-agree(C¬p, Cp)
depending on the order in which the cases are inserted in DB. As a con-
sequence, DB ∪ {Cp, C¬p} cannot be hierarchically consistent. Thus, that
database cannot be consistent either. Therefore, F cannot be permitted.
2. Let f1 = A ⇒ B, f2 = B ⇒ ¬A, and F = {f1, f2}. It is easy to see that
for a case Cf1∧f2 it holds that KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧ factsC |= ⊥ if C3 and
C4 are referenced. That means the case is not consistent. However, without
referencing these cases it is impossible to prove f1 ∧ f2 as a decision formula
within DB.
The set F is permitted. Since Cf1 , Cf2 as constructed in the proof of 1
are consistent. These cases are also not in conflict. In order to prove the
absence of a conflict, we have to check that KBW ∧ presC1 ∧ presC2 6|= ⊥ and
KBW ∧ factsC1 ∧ factsC2 |= ⊥. While the first condition is met, the second
does not hold, since we need CaseDesc = A to entail ⊥.

B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We prove the theorem step by step in the same order the claims are
defined.
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1. We show a stronger statement for CaseDesc = presC (since C is consistent it
has to hold that KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= presC).
We start with AC as the set of all leaf nodes of C that are annotated by
Assess and Ref(D) for some D. For this set all properties (1)–(3) of Defini-
nition 11 clearly hold by consistency of C. However, the set might contain
nodes labeled with Ref(D) which we need to replace in order to fulfill this
criterion of the Theorem, as well.
For a fixed leaf formula (pre → fact) ∈ AC corresponding to a Ref(D) leaf
node, take the set AD for D defined as AC for C. By consistency of D,
we get (a) and (b) for CaseDescD = presD and f = fact. By referential
consistency it holds that KBW ∧ pre |= presD. Therefore, if we replace A
C
by AC\{(pre→ fact)}∪AD, property (a) holds for C and the new AC since
KBW ∧pre |= presD. Property (b) also transfers to the new set, since (b) holds
for the old set and (b) holds forD andAD with respect to CaseDescD = presD
and f = fact.
The process of successively replacing Ref(D) nodes in AC terminates since
AD only contains Ref(E) leaf nodes for E <ref D and DB is finite.
Our proof above actually shows that KBW ∧ presC ∧
∧
(pre→fact)∈A fact |=
factsC , hence (c) follows from consistency of C.
2. The direction ⇒ follows from the first part of the proof since permissibility
implies that we can add a case as specified. So consider ⇐, i.e., let A be a
set supporting for f in circumstances CaseDesc for a court crt.
We can construct a case C by referencing all these decisions and putting f
in a root node that has all these references as child nodes. The properties
(1)–(3) of A (Definition 11) imply consistency of C. The requirement that
the nodes are warranted and that C is at the end of the timeline implies
that we reference correctly.
The DB ∪ {C} is also hierarchically consistent since C does not introduce
new conflicts. Otherwise A would already be in conflict with DB.
3. The direction ⇒ follows immediately from the previous part of the proof
since f is deducible if f is permitted and ¬f is not permitted. The other
direction also follows from the previous part since the existence of A implies
that f is permitted and the non-existence of support for ¬f is implied by
the requirement of B.

B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let crt be a court with must-agree(crt) = ∅. For C1, select an arbitrary
D ∈ DB, and construct ProofTree containing root node f and a single leaf
node (⊤ → f) labeled with Ref(D). Define C1 := (f,⊤,ProofTree, crt). Then
DB ∪ {C1} is case-wise consistent since DB is case-wise consistent (note that
we do not enforce referential consistency, so ignore whether or not f is actually
decided by D). Hierarchical consistency holds simply because C1 does not need
to reference other cases.
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For C2,construct ProofTree containing the single node f labeled with Axiom.
Define C2 := (f,⊤,ProofTree, crt). This case is not consistent; however, DB ∪
{C2} is referentially consistent simply because C2 does not make any references.
Hierarchical consistency holds for the same reason as before. 
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. For ⊥, this holds simply because deducibility requires us to construct a
consistent case with root node ⊥, and any case C one of whose nodes is ⊥ is
not consistent. To see the latter, just note that, if C was consistent, then by
Definition 4 (v) it follows that factsC |= ⊥, which by Definition 4 (iii) means
that C is not consistent.
For {f,¬f}, assume to the contrary that there exist cases Cf = (f,CaseDesc,
ProofTreef , crt) and C¬f = (¬f,CaseDesc,ProofTree¬f , crt) such that ProofTreef
and ProofTree¬f do not contain nodes labeled with Assess, and DB∪{Cf , C¬f} is
consistent (where the new cases are inserted in any order at the end of the time-
line ≤t). But since crt ∈ must-agree(crt), the latter one has to respect the first
one. We show that Cf and C¬f are in conflict, thus contradicting the hierarchical
consistency of DB∪{Cf , C¬f}. Obviously, KBW∧factsCf∧factsC¬f |= f∧¬f |= ⊥.
It remains to show that KBW∧presCf∧presC¬f 6|= ⊥. By consistency of each of Cf
and C¬f , we get (a) KBW ∧CaseDesc 6|= ⊥, (b) KBW ∧CaseDesc |= presCf and (c)
KBW∧CaseDesc |= presC
¬f
. Putting (b) and (c) together gives KBW∧CaseDesc |=
presCf ∧ presC¬f , which with (a) shows KBW ∧CaseDesc∧ presCf ∧ presC¬f 6|= ⊥,
which is stronger than what we needed to prove. Therefore, {f,¬f} is not per-
mitted in DB. 
B.5 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We show the statement for df = is legal action(a) for some a. The proof for
¬is legal action(a) is analogous. Given consistency of C, we get that factsC |= df.
Transforming factsC to a CNF formula, we can write factsC as φW ∧ φL where
is legal action(a) only occurs in φL. Since φW ∧ φL |= is legal action(a) we can
assume that φL does not contain ¬is legal action(a). Otherwise we could remove
the ¬is legal action(a) maintaining the property of φW ∧φL |= is legal action(a).
Every literal lj of the formula φL has the form is legal action(a)∨
∨
1≤i≤k xi,
which is equivalent to (
∧
1≤i≤k
¬xi)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:rj
⇒ is legal action(a). Hence, we can write φL
as (
∨
1≤j≤m rj)⇒ is legal action(a). We define φS :=
∨
1≤j≤m rj and get
φW ∧ (φS ⇒ is legal action(a)) |= is legal action(a)
where neither φW nor φS contain is legal action(a). Therefore, it must hold that
φW |= φS . However, this argumentation was only applicable in the case C since
KBW ∧ CaseDesc |= presC . Hence we can derive the norm φ
+ := presC ∧ φS as
positive norm. 
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B.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. The consistency ofN(C) follows from the previous theorem. The leaves of
N(C) are the same as the leaves of C, and thus referentially consistency follows
from C’s referential consistency. In addition, df of N(C), as well as presC of
N(C), are the same as of C, and thus N(C) is in conflict with a case iff C is.
Therefore, hierarchical consistency is also maintained. 
B.7 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Recall that Σp2 = NP
NP. Membership follows because we can guess the
set A and check, using an NP oracle, the three entailment tests (1–3). The
consistency of the set with DB can also be answered by the NP oracle since
verifying a conflict can be done in polynomial time.
For hardness, consider a QBF formula of the form ∃X∀Y φ(X,Y ) where each
of X and Y are variable sets and φ(X,Y ) is an arbitrary propositional formula in
the variables X ∪Y . Testing validity of ∃X∀Y φ(X,Y ) is Σp2 -hard. To polynomi-
ally reduce this to permissibility testing over a propositional logic, we construct
a corresponding case law database DB as follows. For each x ∈ X , DB includes a
case (x,⊤,ProofTree, crt) where ProofTree consists of a single Assess node of the
form ⊤ → x, as well as a case (¬x,⊤,ProofTree, crt) where ProofTree consists of
a single Assess node of the form ⊤ → ¬x. In other words, for each x we have
both truth-value decisions available for A to choose from. We set f := φ(X,Y ).
Obviously, this reduction is polynomial in the size of the formula ∃X∀Y φ(X,Y ).
To see that the reduction is correct, observe that f is permitted in DB iff there
exists a truth assignment a to X which, viewed as a conjunction of literals, en-
tails φ(X,Y ), i.e., a |= φ(X,Y ). The latter is the case iff there exists a s.t., for
all truth assignments to Y , φ(a(X), Y ) is true (where φ(a(X), Y ) instantiates
each x ∈ X with a(x)). This, finally, is the case iff ∃X∀Y φ(X,Y ) is valid, which
is what we needed to show. 
B.8 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. According to [14], the expressiveness of the description logic ALC ex-
tended concept constructors fills and one-of by role constructors role-and,
role-not, product, and inverse is equal to the expressiveness of first-order
predicate logic with predicates of arity at most 2 and at most 2 free variables
(in any subformula). Consequently, we show that the construction for first-order
logic increase neither the arity of predicates nor the number of free variables.
Let L = {n1 = (pre1 → fact1), . . . , nk = (prek → factk)} be the set of all
warranted leaf formulas of cases C′ ∈ DB with label Assess. We need to construct
a first-order formula φ that is valid iff there exists A ⊆ L such that the three
implications (1–3) of Definition 11 hold. Our idea is to encode the choice of
that subset as an “on/off switch” associated with each ni. The switch will be
realized through an existential quantifier over x1, . . . , xk and a unary predicate
choseni for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} which we add to the FOL signature (w.l.o.g. all
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choseni do not occur in any prei or facti). The meaning of the predicate is that
choseni(xi) holds if and only if ni is chosen for the set A.
We next define the formulas φpreSwitchi := (¬choseni(xi)∨prei) and φ
factSwitch
i :=
(¬choseni(xi)∨ facti) to implement our switches. Note that, if for xi it holds that
¬choseni(xi), then both φ
preSwitch
i and φ
factSwitch
i simplify to ⊤; if for xi it holds
that choseni(xi), then φ
preSwitch
i simplifies to prei and φ
factSwitch
i simplifies to facti.
Using these building blocks, we define our correspondences to the implications
(1–3), as follows:
(1) φ(1) := KBW ∧ CaseDesc⇒
∧k
i=1 φ
preSwitch
i .
(2) φ(2) := KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧
∧k
i=1 φ
factSwitch
i ⇒ f .
(3) φ(3) := ¬(KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧
∧k
i=1 φ
factSwitch
i ⇒ ⊥).
Our formula φ then is defined simply as φ := φ(1) ∧ φ(2) ∧ φ(3). We now prove
that φ is satisfiable iff there exists A ⊆ L such that the three implications (a–c)
hold.
“⇐”: Assume there is a setA such that the implications (1–3) hold. We define
an assignment a for the xi as follows: if (prei → facti) ∈ A, then choseni(x) ≡ ⊤
and otherwise choseni(x) ≡ ⊥. Then
∧k
i=1 φ
preSwitch
i reduces to
∧
(pre→fact)∈A pre
and
∧k
i=1 φ
factSwitch
i reduces to
∧
(pre→fact)∈A fact. Thus, (1) implies I, a |= φ
(1),
(2) implies I, a |= φ(2) and (3) implies I, a |= φ(3) for every FOL interpretation
I. Consequently, φ is satisfiable.
“⇒”: Now assume φ is satisfiable, i.e., there is an interpretation I such that
I |= φ holds. Therefore, there is an assignment a for the xi such that I, a |=
φ(1) ∧ φ(2) ∧ φ(3). For such an assigment a, we define A := {(prei → facti) |
I, a |= choseni(xi)}. For this set A the formulas φ(1), φ(2), φ(3) can be reduced as
in “⇐”, i.e., the conditions (1–3) hold.
We cannot apply the result of [14] directly, since the x1, . . . , xk introduce
many free variables in φ(1)∧φ(2)∧φ(3). To clarify how we can reduce this number,
we consider the formula ∃x1, . . . , xk : φ which is satisfiable iff φ is satisfiable.
The formula φ(3) is logically equivalent to KBW ∧CaseDesc∧
∧k
i=1 φ
factSwitch
i .
Calling this formula ψ(3), it follows that φ(2) ∧ φ(3) is equivalent to ψ(3) ∧ f and
φ(1) ∧ φ(2) ∧ φ(3) is equivalent to ψ(3) ∧ f ∧
∧k
i=1 φ
preSwitch
i . By reordering the
conjunctive literals, we get
KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧ f ∧
k∧
i=1
(φpreSwitchi ∧ φ
factSwitch
i )
By definition φpreSwitchi ∧ φ
factSwitch
i is equivalent to ψi(xi) = ¬choseni(xi) ∨
(prei ∧ facti)). Now, the variable xi occurs only once in the whole formula. This
allows us to rewrite φ as formula ψ :=
KBW ∧ CaseDesc ∧ f ∧
k∧
i=1
((∃xi : ¬choseni(xi)) ∨ (prei ∧ facti))
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Here it is easy to see that the transformations of [14] are applicable to the for-
mula ψ leading to a description logic expression if and only if they are applicable
to KBW ,CaseDesc, f, prei, and facti. However, since we these formulas are formu-
lated in the same description logic, it follows that the mentioned transformation
is applicable leading to a description logic expression for ψ. 
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